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Sally Sedgwick’s Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity is superb; 
everyone working in German idealism or any related field should read it immediately and 
repeatedly. She provides expert interpretations of key arguments from Hegel’s early Jena-period 
essays and from some later works, liberating Hegel from a series of long-dominant but flawed 
interpretations and bringing new attention to an overlooked aspect of his teachings on 
conceptuality, sensibility, and the mind-world relation generally. No book can satisfy all its 
readers’ demands, and an important book will perhaps satisfy the fewest, instead opening brand 
new avenues for their dissatisfaction. Sedgwick’s is an important book, and the dissatisfactions its 
persuasive, detailed, and powerful arguments make possible will provoke new work in response for 
years to come. 
In scholarly-historical terms, Sedgwick attempts to overturn and replace a series of 
interpretations of Hegel’s critique of Kant that, she claims, miss the force and scope of that 
critique. (And for Sedgwick, Hegel’s criticisms of Kant constitute precisely a critique: a 
determination of the limits of Kant’s thought.) Among the highpoints of her interpretation are an 
illuminating reading of Hegel’s remarks on Kant’s so-called restriction thesis, whereby Kant limits 
our knowledge to appearances, and a patient discussion of Hegel’s comments on the 
Transcendental Deduction of the first Critique. The ultimate aim all her arguments serve is the 
exhibition of what she regards as Hegel’s core complaint: that Kant’s dualisms rest on an 
unwarranted ‘thesis of absolute opposition’ between (conceptual) form and (sensible) content, a 
thesis motivated by an exalted and demonstrably false estimation of our powers of abstraction. 
Running the length of her discussion is an innovative reading of Hegel’s appeal to the Kantian 
‘intuitive intellect’, an appeal Sedgwick construes as aimed at recovering a more modest view of 
our philosophical powers than the one on which Kant relies.  
In advancing this interpretation, Sedgwick also engages some recent debates in Anglophone 
philosophy of mind, insofar as her Hegel pairs his frequently-discussed conceptualism with its 
dialectical partner, resulting in a position committed to the robust mutual dependency of conceptual 
form (‘spontaneity’) and sensible content (‘receptivity’). Thus while Hegel indeed holds that pure, 
isolated, passive receptivity can make no intelligible contribution to knowledge, cognition, or 
experience, his criticisms of Kant expose parallel difficulties with any alleged pure, isolated, active 
spontaneity. No non-conceptual content, then, but no non-intuitive form, either. 
 Sedgwick begins (Chapter 1) by exploring Kant’s conception of our discursive cognition, 
contrasting it sharply with his parallel conception of an intuitive intellect, and showing 
convincingly that Hegel’s summaries of the Kantian position and arguments are designed to be, and 
when read correctly are, uncontroversial. Next (Chapter 2) she turns to the links between Kant’s 
conception of organic unity and the organically unified cognition and experience available to a 
Kantian intuitive intellect. Hegel’s interest in organic unity, Sedgwick tells us, comes from his 
doubts about Kant’s entitlement to his fundamental dualisms—an entitlement Hegel thinks rests on 
an excessively sanguine view of our power, through reflection and abstraction, to divide our 
initially unified cognition and experience cleanly and neatly into concept and intuition, form and  
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content. For Sedgwick’s Hegel, all thinking involves some reflection and abstraction, some 
generalization and distinction, but no thinking can carry such abstraction to the final, ultimate 
dualisms on which Kant so famously insists. She develops (Chapter 3) her reading of these 
Hegelian doubts by considering his attacks on the ‘subjectivity’ of Kant’s philosophy (about which 
more below), before turning (Chapter 4) to Hegel’s much-discussed treatment of the Kantian 
‘original synthetic unity of apperception’. Here she aims to undermine the (broadly conceptualist-
coherentist) interpretation on which Hegel reads Kant as claiming that the understanding generates 
both the forms of intuition and the categories. Next (Chapter 5) she presents an interpretation of 
Hegel’s critical method and his own account of conceptual form, before turning (Chapter 6) to his 
remarks on the second and third Antinomies as test cases for her interpretive approach. 
 As this summary suggests, two motifs recur throughout Sedgwick’s book: that Hegel was 
an astute, rather straightforward reader of Kant, and that he was wholly and single-mindedly 
opposed to Kant’s claim that philosophy achieves a priori insight into the timeless, necessary, and 
universal conditions of all human cognition. Much of the book’s persuasive power lies in 
Sedgwick’s careful presentation of Hegel’s objections to seemingly modest Kantian claims as 
rejections of the genuinely extravagant Kantian commitments underlying those claims. Her reading 
of Hegel’s attack on Kant’s restriction thesis is an instructive instance. According to the restriction 
thesis, it follows from the discursive nature of human cognition that our knowledge is restricted to 
appearances, and is therefore not knowledge of things in themselves. Hegel objects to this thesis, 
insisting that we do indeed have knowledge of things in themselves. His objection is often ascribed 
to his alleged inability to grasp, or unwillingness to heed, Kant’s frequent warnings that the 
(idealist) distinction between appearances and things in themselves is wholly different from the 
(empiricist) distinction between secondary (mind-dependent) and primary (mind-independent) 
qualities. Hegel didn’t understand Kant’s basic point, consequently didn’t understand his 
arguments in support of it, and ultimately offered only obtuse and irrelevant objections—so the 
usual story goes. 
 Sedgwick calmly and deliberately shreds this story to bits, arguing that Hegel’s objection 
traces Kant’s restriction thesis back to another, deeper Kantian thesis, the ‘thesis of absolute 
opposition’. According to this deeper thesis—one he shares, according to Hegel, with Locke, 
Hume, and others—the form of objects and their content or matter are absolutely opposed: the 
empirical world ‘gets its form as appearance from our a priori forms of intuition, space and time, 
[and] its form as a thinkable content from our a priori concepts or categories’ (83), but that form 
‘is taken to owe nothing of its nature and origin to the realm of the empirical’ (71). This thesis, says 
Sedgwick, is itself based on two Kantian assumptions: that we cannot ‘trace the form of our 
experience back to sense impressions, since [that] form… is indebted to what… gets added by 
thought’ and ‘that since form gets added in this way, it cannot be grounded in that independent 
content itself’ (91). Thus what Hegel rejects is first and foremost this complex of deeper views, 
according to which form is radically distinct from content and philosophical abstraction is capable 
of accessing, and reflecting upon, pure form. The restriction thesis is thus merely a specifically 
Kantian outgrowth of this more deeply rooted assumption in modern philosophy. Hegel thus does 
not ‘depriv[e] objects wholly independent of our concepts of any role to play in our knowledge’; 
rather ‘the very idea of a realm of pure thought is for Hegel an abstraction’ (97) to be replaced by 
his ‘new account of conceptual form’ (125).  
 In further developing this new Hegelian account of conceptual form, Sedgwick emphasizes 
Hegel’s (often overlooked) arguments against purely formal thought and his competing conception 
of philosophical analysis. For Sedgwick’s Hegel, such analysis is not aimed at underwriting the  
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assumptions upon which our presumptively valid claims are based but rather at revealing ‘that the 
assumptions with which our inquiry set out are not what we initially took them to be’ and that we 
are thus ‘mistaken in our initial self-understanding’ (155). Ultimately, then, Hegelian analysis 
‘does not serve the purpose of finally grounding the supposedly universally and necessarily valid 
assumptions with which we begin; it instead makes their contingency explicit’ (155). This 
contingency is demonstrated through the ‘history of false starts in the efforts of philosophers to 
ground their science’, a history given in the Phenomenology and Logic, one that reveals ‘a chronic 
condition’ of ‘blindness or ignorance’ that is itself ‘a necessary consequence of our limited powers 
of abstraction’ (156-7). 
 On this view, Hegel’s early Jena claims that our cognition involves an ‘original identity’ do 
not attribute to us a divine creative power, but rather express the inherent dependence of form and 
content, spontaneity and receptivity, concept and intuition. In light of this dependence, Hegel’s 
commitment to a (broadly Kantian) rejection of non-conceptual content is essentially joined to a 
commitment to the claim that our concepts ‘depend on an independently given sensible content… 
for their nature’ and for the material to which they apply. If Hegel is correct, we  must reject the 
myth of the given in both its exogenous (non-conceptual content) and endogenous (empty 
formalist) versions, and affirm that while our concepts cannot be ‘products of mere receptivity’, 
they are also ‘not products of pure spontaneity’ (160-1, note 47). 
There are difficulties and puzzles here, to be sure. If Hegel infers (inductively?) a 
necessary limitation on our powers of abstraction, how is that inference better warranted than 
Kant’s inferences to necessary limitations on our use of the understanding? How does the mutual 
dependence of form and content play out in terms of the sociality at work in every moment of 
Hegel’s thought? How does it play out in terms of the technical content of Hegel’s treatment of 
formal logic? Is it really fair to collapse the differences between the argumentative strategies of 
the Logic and the Phenomenology into single ‘history of false starts’? How are we to understand 
Hegel’s own (very Kantian-looking) faculty psychology in light of this interpretation? What 
about his exalted claims for absolute knowing? Do Hegel’s criticisms of Kant really not evolve at 
all after the early Jena essays? Yet to point to these puzzles is not to complain about Sedgwick’s 
book; it is to be driven by it to a fresh encounter with a newly challenging old friend.  
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